Karadzic, Bosnia, and the post-UDI world

Now that former Republika Srpska President Dr. Radovan Karadžić has been arrested and transferred to The Hague, media coverage of Bosnia and Herzegovina has resurfaced and, as always, the Serbs have been blamed for Bosnia’s current troubles.

For example, this appeared in the recent issue of The Economist:

This is not quite the end of the Balkan tragedy precipitated by the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The Bosnian Serb military commander, Ratko Mladic, is still at large, as is one other big fish wanted by The Hague. Bosnia continues to be troubled by internal divisions, with its Serb entity still threatening to declare unilateral independence. Serbia itself has come no closer to accepting the independence of Kosovo, which it sees as a renegade southern province.

The astute reader, of course, knows by now that if someone is blaming everything on the Serbs, chances are, things are not that simple.

Welcome to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The region has always been a microcosm of the greater Yugoslavia — the multi-ethnic, multi-confessional make-up of the Land of the Southern Slavs was encapsulated in Bosnia. Odd as it sounds, if the raison d’etre for the break-up of Yugoslavia, offered by the Western powers, was its multi-ethnicity, then the same reason is now used to defend the existence of Bosnia as an independent state.

But things have not been smooth sailing in the post-Dayton Bosnia. Bosnia is really two states, loosely joined — the Republika Srpska and the Muslim and Croat run Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH). And just this month, the Financial Times reported (in a story the Economist didn’t cover) that the FBH is in a state of financial crisis, euphemistically labeled by the IMF as a “liquidity squeeze”. Call it what you’d like, but the government finished the month with only €221 in its treasury.

Meanwhile, the FBH political system is undergoing a crisis of its own. The Croats, who have always been an ethnic minority in Bosnia, are calling for their own entity, threatening the break-up of FBH.

On the flip side, Republika Srpska has more or less prospered. It has enacted socio-economic reforms and privatization and enjoys relative political stability.

Bosnia’s problems can’t be blamed on Bosnia’s Serbs. Bosnian Muslims and Croats have been calling for the abolition of Republika Srpska for a long time. Serbs responded by threatening to hold a referendum on independence. Yes, such a referendum would violate Dayton (so would the abolition of the RS, by the way). But, remember, we live in the post-UDI world; in the post-UDI world, Dayton no longer holds.

The Bush Administration maintains that Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) is not a precedent. The Economist agrees. (Of course, the Economist also believed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction … but that’s a whole different story.) But for the astute observer, few things are different about the statuses of Kosovo and Republika Srpska. Both are autonomous entities. Both have a dominant ethnic group. Both ethnic groups already have a nation-state (Albania and Serbia, respectively). Both have lived through conflict. Perhaps the only difference — Kosovo houses Camp Bondsteel, a 955-acre base built by the United States. We find out from Wikipedia that to construct the base “two hills were lopped off and the valley between them was filled with the resulting material.” Tax dollars move mountains.

Maybe that’s part of the reason why we’ve got a $9.5 trillion federal debt, with a record-breaking budget deficit of $482 billion this year. That doesn’t include an additional $80 billion for the military.

Or can we blame that problem on the Serbs, too?

Ukraine’s Political Drama

Despite the attempt by Ukrainian President Victor Yuschenko to sabotage the celebrations of the 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia for political expediency, on the whole the event seemed to have been a success.

To his credit, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew did not take the bait laid down by the Ukrainian political establishment. Other than a few (expected) Byzantinophilic remarks at the square in front of the church of the Holy Wisdom, the remainder of his speeches were balanced. He spoke of the importance of unity and the danger of introducing nationalism into the realm of religion. *

Michael Denisenko, the soi-disant Patriarch Philaret, and Yan Modzalevsky, the soi-disant Metropolitan Methodius, who head Ukraine’s two schismatic sects, did not show up at any of the events. Scandal was avoided.

On the other hand, credit is certainly due to Russia for some covert and well-played diplomacy. How else would one explain the obviously pro-Russian concert on Independence Square and the presence, in large numbers, of Nashi, the youth wing of Vladimir Putin’s United Russia Party?

In addition, one should not underestimate the importance of a face-to-face meeting between Patriarch Bartholomew and Patriarch Alexey II. Much to Yuschenko’s chagrin, the event may actually improve the tense relations between the two Patriarchates.

Now turn to the Ukrainian political arena. In the perpetually revolving Triangle of Yuschenko-Timoshenko-Yanukovich, which dominates (or, rather, is isomorphic with) Ukrainian politics, the three vertexes took their respective positions. President Yuschenko — treating Patriarch Bartholomew to a papal welcome. Former Prime-Minister and now opposition leader Victor Yanukovich — joining the Russian ambassador to meet Patriarch Alexey. The oddball in the Triangle this time was Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko.

Timoshenko was not at Yuschenko’s botched “One nation – one church” rally in front of the church of the Holy Wisdom. She was not at the St Vladimir Hill at the concelebration of the Patriarchs Bartholomew and Alexey. She was in Carpathian Ukraine, touring the site of recent flooding.

Interestingly, almost immediately the Yuschenko administration attempted to use the Prime Minister’s absence to her own detriment. Yuschenko’s press secretary, Victor Baloga, joked to reporters that “Perhaps the head of government is not Orthodox but tends to some other faith — Shintoism or Buddhism, for example?” So reported Russia’s IA Regnum news agency.

But of course it’s Ukraine, and everything is fair game for politics, even something as odd-sounding to the Ukrainian ear as Shintoism.

Yulia Timoshenko deserves credit for at least one thing — she’s a shrewd politician. The presidential elections are fast approaching, and the political triangle, always scalene, is fast shifting. Yuschenko’s botched attempt to meddle in church affairs can only decrease his already low approval ratings.

Remember, that Ukraine is divided into two halves; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is strong in both. On the other hand, the three vertexes of the political Triangle can only hope on the support of one half each. Victor Yanukovich is firmly grounded in the East. Not involving herself in church events can only get Timoshenko extra points in the West. The incumbent president, on the other hand, is out of luck. Remember, the one who doesn’t get a half of the country sits out the inning.  As we approach the bottom of this one, Yuschenko gets ready to sit out the next.

As always, in Ukraine it’s all really very simple. There are three vertexes to the Triangle, and on a good day any two of them are aligned against the third.

* P.S. In words reminiscent of those of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky), the Ecumenical Patriarch said, turning to President Yuschenko:

Your problems are also our problems. Your joys and your happiness are our joys and our happiness.

Pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerunt.

Kostunica: Serbia has no independent policy

The arrest of former Republika Srpska president Dr. Radovan Karadžić has sparked the usual anti-Serb bigotry in the Western media, with some going so far as to call Dr. Karadžić the “Serbian Usama bin Laden”.

Then there is the irony of the timing of the arrest — shortly after the forming of the new Serbian government, led by the Socialist Party. That’s the same Socialist Party that so vehemently protested against the arest of its former leader, the late Slobodan Milosevic. Of course, one will do anything for power.

Dr. Vojislav Koštunica, the former Serbian Prime-Minister now opposition leader, summed up the current state of Serbian politics pretty well in his interview to Glas Javnosti — “Serbia has no independent policy.” He continued: “[The current government] only fulfills the endless demands coming from Washington and Brussels.”

Of course, it’s clear as day to anyone that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is just a sham. This is the same tribunal that found Naser Orić, the Bosnian Muslim commander who boasted of slaughtering thousands of Serbs near Srebrenica, not guilty.  The same tribunal that acquitted Ramuš Haradinaj, the former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army. And the same tribunal that stood through the revelations of trading body organs of Serbs, put forth by former special prosecutor Carla del Ponte.

The Russian government and the former Koštunica cabinet had already called for the shutting down of the ICTY sham, but to no avail. This time, the same old drama will be performed again, as Dr. Karadžić is tried for the “Srebrenica Massacre”, which, by the way, we now know was a hoax.

Meanwhile, Dr. Karadžić has prepared himself well. Vecernje Novosti reports that he fasted for six days, received Holy Communion, and is spending his time in jail reading the Bible and St Nicholas (Velemirovic).

For more analysis of the Karadžić arrest, see Dr. Trifkovic’s excellent article here.

Bartholomew, Yuschenko rewrite history

The celebration of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Russia was first put forth by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. I’m sure that UOC hierarchs are now regretting it — Ukrainian president Victor Yuschenko has effectively turned this religious celebration into a political event.

Start with the invitation of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to officiate at the festivities. By canon law, only the primate of a local Orthodox Church can invite the primate of another local Orthodox Church to officiate at its ceremonies. Thus, the invitation to Bartholomew should have come from Patriarch Alexey of Moscow, or, at the least, from Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev. In any case, not from Yuschenko.

Yet in the lead-up to festvities, Kiev was decorated with huge posters bearing Bartholomew’s portrait. Metropolitan Cyril of Smolensk pointed out, rather astutely, that in their campaign of adoration for the spiritual leader of 3000 ethnic Greeks in Istanbul, Turkey, the Ukrainian authorities surpassed the Soviets’ adoration for Lenin and other leaders of the revolution.

Bartholomew was greeted with the pomp reminiscent of the visit to Ukraine by the late Pope John Paul II. President Victor Yuschenko met the Istanbul-based Patriarch with full state honors at Kiev’s Borispol airport. Oddly (or not), Metropolitan Vladimir (who’s diocese Bartholomew was entering) stood afar off and watched.

At their remarks in front of Kiev’s cathedral of the Holy Wisdom (now a museum controlled by the government), Yuschenko and Patriarch Bartholomew spoke about the importance of this event. Yuschenko:

This is a feast of Christianity, a feast of European civilization. This is a feast of the universal Christian community and a feast of Orthodoxy. This is a feast of Ukraine and of all her Christian churches. This is a feast of our thousand-year old nation. And today this feast comes back home.

The fate of the Kiev metropolia reminds us of our own fate. She blossomed in Kiev, she journeyed to Galich, she returned to the capital by the will of the Cossacks, and her ministry has not been dissolved by time. It was transformed to the genetic desire of our nation to be free, to have its own state, and its own church.

Which Ukrainian churches (other than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) are celebrating this event is unclear. But one thing is clear – Yuschenko doesn’t know his history. The Kiev metropolia was transferred to Vladimir and then to Moscow as a result of the Tatar-Mongol conquest. It was never in Galich. And for Yuschenko, the ministry of the Church is to make people desire freedom, not salvation. Obviously, he never attended Sunday school.

Enter Patriarch Bartholomew:

This manifold event celebrates the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the christianization of Europeans. This event underlines the new European perspectives of the Ukrainian nation at a time of rapid and great changes in the world. Therefore, the Mother Church rejoices together with the pious Ukrainian people, for this baptism remains an unceasing source of strength.

Um … OK. I’m not sure what the role of the EP in the “Christianization of Europe” was, but I doubt it’s as great as Patriarch Bartholomew would have us think. After all, Sts Cyril and Methodius were Bulgarian and in 988, St Vladimir received the Orthodox faith most probably from Bulgaria. The first Russian bishops were Bulgarians. It was not until the Byzantine Emperor defeated the Bulgarian Empire in 1018 and Constantinople subsequently anulled the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Church, that Russia received metropolitans from the Ecumenical Patriarchate (the first Greek metropolitan was Theopemptos in 1038). Most historians agree that the Greeks subsequently purged all Russian historical documents in the 11th century of Bulgarian references as a way to support Greek nationalism.

Remember, that according to Byzantine political though, the Byzantine emperor was the world-wide political leader of all Christians, whether they knew it or not. The Russian princes were not too keen on that idea, as is evidenced by continued wars with Byzantium even after the baptism of Russia in 988.

But I digress … Patriarch Alexey II arrived in Kiev on July 26. The spiritual leader of Ukraine’s 20-or-so million Orthodox was greeted by Metropolitan Vladimir at the Borispol airport. Yuschenko was not there; the government was represented by Victor Chernomyrdin — Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine — and Victor Yanukovich, head of the Party of Regions — the Parliamentary opposition. There was very little pomp an circumstance; prior to the Patriarch’s arrival, all posters of Alexey II were banned in Kiev.

And maybe it should be that way. After all, for Orthodox Christians, Patriarch Alexey is a monk, not a political figurehead. And instead of the President and the Press he enjoyed the company of thousands of his faithful, who came not for eloquent speaches bur for quiet prayer with, and for, their first hierarch.

Russia’s First Service to St John of San Francisco

On July 2 (June 19 o.s.), the day of the repose of St John, Wonderworker of Shanghai and San Francisco, the first ever service to St John took place at Moscow’s Stauropeghial Monastery of the Meeting of the Vladimir Icon (Sretensky Monastery). Archimandrite Tikhon, the monastery’s superior, presided over the All-night Vigil and the Divine Liturgy. The homily was given by Protopriest Alexander Lebedeff, rector of Holy Transfiguration Cathedral in Los Angeles, California.

This service was possible following the decision of the Council of Bishops to glorify St John for church-wide commemoration.

You can hear recordings of the All-night Vigil here, and the Divine Liturgy here.

Hierarchical Vigil at the Meeting of the Vladimir Icon Monastery

According to Pravoslavie.ru, Metropolitan Hilarion celebrated the All-night Vigil for the feast of All Saints of Russia on June 28 at Moscow’s Stauropeghial Monastery of the Meeting of the Vladimir Icon (Sretensky Monastery). Vladyka was joined by His Eminence Metropolitan Onuphrius of Chernovtsy and Bukovina; His Eminence Archbishop Mark of Berlin, Germany, and Great Britain; His Eminence Archbishop Gabriel of Blagoveschensk and Tynda; His Eminence Archbishop Sergius of Ternopol and Kremenets; His Eminence Archbishop Maximilian of Vologda and Velikiy Ustyug; His Grace Bishop Eutechius of Domodedovo (the former ROCOR bishop of Ishim and Siberia -A.A.); and Archimandrite Tikhon, the monastery’s superior.

Following the service, Archimandrite Tikhon thanked the First-Hierarch for his special love for the Monastery and presented Vladyka with a portrait of Metropolitan Laurus, of blessed memory. Photos of the event are available here.

Metropolitan Hilarion: “We are joyful because we are able to work together”

Metropolitan Hilarion’s exclusive interview to RIA Novosti’s Andrew Zolotov. (Russian original here).

Vladyka, in your report on the first day of the Council you stressed that you are here for the first time and, thus, you may find many things new or difficult to understand. Almost three days of the Council have passed. What are your impressions and feelings?

First of all, it is a joyous feeling, because we, hierarchs from abroad, are able, for the first time, to participate in such close communion with our brother bishops. Of course, we have not met many of them yet. But, I think, many of the Russian bishops do not know each other well either, for there have been many new bishops ordained recently.  We are joyful because we are able to work together, because we can learn more about the life of the Church here, about those problems that exist in Russia and those that must be tackled by the whole Church.  It is a heartfelt feeling when we meet new hierarchs and are able talk with them; this reveals the fullness of brotherly love and understanding. We see that they are wonderful people, whom, unfortunately, we have previously only known from far away, through photographs or news. But now we have brotherly communion. This is a strengthening process for the entire Church.

You said in your report that the question of the Russian Orthodox Church’s leaving the World Council of Churches is still on the table.  Has there been any discussion of this question in the working groups or backstage?

There were no official discussions. However, many of the hierarchs came up to me and expressed their support. They were satisfied that someone had raised this issue. Actually, God’s people everywhere are waiting for this. This would greatly simplify our state of affairs abroad, where many of our faithful — both clergy and lay — have gone into schism because of this very issue. Reconsidering our membership in the World Council of Churches (perhaps we can continue our presence as observers — this is the position of the Roman Catholic Church) would, probably, please many of those people who feel that our past presence in the WCC and other ecumenical ventures exceeded the limits of what is allowed. Resolving this issue will be a great joy for the entire Church.

We should not be afraid that our witness about Orthodoxy would, in some way, be lessened. On the contrary, people are attracted to the Church when they see that the Orthodox faith is lived out in the lives of ordinary people. The fact that our Church has not changed anything of its teaching, that it remains faithful to the apostolic doctrines and to the other traditions of the Church, this is what attracts Westerners from Protestantism and Catholicism. They see that the Church does not change its teaching or practice to go along with with the flow of modernity, but remains in Orthodoxy, in the teachings laid down by the our Saviour and the Apostles. This is why people come to the Orthodox faith. And this will continue, because both modern Protestant churches and Catholicism are on the decline. Yet Orthodoxy is growing.

Speaking of the growth of Orthodoxy, the question of missionary work was also addressed at the Council. You have some experience of missionary work in a heterodox and foreign environment.  What, in your opinion, is most important for missionary work in the modern world?

First of all, it is our internal mission. We must convert back to Orthodoxy our own Russian people, those who have not yet been baptized or have not yet believed. This is an enormous task. Our task abroad is very similar because we, too, first need to work with our own flock. We need to work with our youth. For example, when they have mixed marriages, they gradually leave the Church. Sometimes the husband or the wife becomes Orthodox, but this, frequently, does not change the situation for the better. Or the issue of assimilation; this is another problem. Therefore, we are working with our youth in order to keep them in the Church. But we also bear witness to those outside the Church.  We are always ready to accept them if they are trully interested in accepting Orthodoxy. We prepare them through a process of catechesis and the accept them into the Church through baptism, or, sometimes, through anointing with Chrism.

We do not go around door-to-door as do other religious groups. On the contrary, people find out about Orthodoxy through literature, through their friends, through family members, through religious publications. People come a variety of different ways.

Even before your election as First-Hierarch of ROCOR, you went to Latin America in an attempt to bring back those who have gone into schism. What is the present state of those who left the Russian Church Abroad following its reunification with the Moscow Patriarchate?

In Latin America – no. [It is unclear what Vladyka means. The Russian phrase here is a fragment. -A.A.] There are not many clergy there; a few priests in a couple of countries, in Brazil, Argentina, or Chile, for example, who have left. I was able to speak with all of them. They told me their reasons for leaving us. Of course, they were isolated. Their ruling hierarch passed away a few years ago, and we could not find a replacement right away. Right now there is a bishop there [Vladyka John of Caracas was ordained shortly before the start of the Council -A.A.], but before that there was no local pastoral care. They decided that their questions were left unanswered. I think this happened because they were not fully informed. And, perhaps, because of their isolation, they hold on to their old convictions, to their mistrust for hierarchy here, in Russia. Perhaps because they have not been able to visit Russia and to see that everything has changed, that the Church here is free. But many are also worried about the issue of ecumenism. In Australia, too, many of those who left said that the main reason for their leaving was the Moscow Patriarchate’s continued membership in the World Council of Churches.

Vladyka, our experience here, in Russia, has shown that the same people who protested against the Russian Orthodox Church’s membership in the World Council of Churches then became supporters of canonizing Ivan the Terrible, and so forth. [Zolotov is referring to a movement in Russia calling against modern passports, tax id numbers, and for the canonization of Ivan the Terrible and Rasputin -A.A.]

Of course, there are extremes. But I am speaking of ordinary parishionners who are concerned. There are some people who will never be satisfied and will always find a reason for their dissatisfaction. But that is not the majoirty of the faithful.

Post-Council News

Though the Council itself has come to an end, the first post-Council day was marked by several newsworthy events. A previously unannounced emergency meeting of the Holy Synod was called to deal with the Chukotka crisis. In its decision, the Synod cited the Council’s decision to depose Bishop Diomedes of Anadyr and Chukotka for violation of church discipline and inciting schism, and cited paragraph 5 of the Statute, which gives the Holy Synod the power to appoint and dismiss bishops.

The Holy Synod resolved to dismiss Bishop Diomedes from the Chukotka cathedra and place him under suspension. The decision of his deposition or repentance is to be made at the next regularly-scheduled Synod meeting. The Holy Synod summoned Bishop Diomedes to this meeting, which will presumably be held in July. Archbishop Mark of Khabarovsk and the Amur Region was appointed temporary administrator of the Chukotka diocese.

At its emergency session, the Holy Synod was in its normal spring membership (that is, not the expanded membership of the Council Presidium) — Metropolitan Daniel of Tokyo, Metropolitan Hilarion of New York, and Metropolitan Cornelius of Tallinn were not present.

Interestingly, the decision to suspend Bishop Diomedes seemed to contradict earlier statements by members of the Holy Synod. At the Council’s concluding press conference on June 27, the hierarchs were asked who will be appointed temporary administrator of the Chukotka diocese. Metropolian Clement of Borovsk responded that Bishop Diomedes had not been suspended and has been given until the next synod to repent.

At the press conference itself, the issue of the Chukotka bishop seemed to be of the most interest to the press. While Metropolitan Clement and Metropolitan Cyrill attempted to focus on other Council decisions, the majority of the questions were asked about Bishop Diomedes.

Also today ( June 28 ) the Bishops served a Service of Thanksgiving at the Holy Dormition Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin. After the Service, the Patriarch said:

Following the ascetic example of our holy hierarchs, beginning with the first Hierarch Michael, Metropolitan of Kiev, and ending with the holy Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow … we acknowledge our responsibility for the future of the Church of Christ.

…

For them [the holy hierarchs -A.A.], the Church was united and independent of any [political or social -A.A.] boundaries dividing their flock.

Photos of the Moleben are available here.

The day concluded with a reception at the State Kremlin Palace. The hierarchs were addressed by Vladimir Putin, the Russian Prime-Minister, who vouched continued support for the Church, saying:

The state is determined to continue supporting Church initiatives targeted at strengthening civil society and reaching inter-religious harmony as well as [supporting] its social, cultural, educational, and philanthropic missions.

For his part, Patriarch Alexey II said:

No matter what difficulties our peoples have suffered, no matter how their political organization has changed, they have always remained faithful to the Truth of Christ, kind-hearted and patient, able to see, treasure, and create beauty.

…

Let us firmly keep peace and unity, founded upon true faith and honest love. Let all the saints of the Russian Church help us in this. Amen.

The reception ended with a concert by various vocal and instrumental groups from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Photos of the reception are available here.

Though it had been widely rumored that he would be present, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev did not attend. Following the conclusion of the Russia-EU summit, the President remained in Khanti-Mansiisk for the opening of the Worldwide Summit of Finno-Ugric Peoples.

Finally, a few words about press coverage. The Council went almost unnoticed by the Western media.  Both Reuters and the AP ran stories about the deposition of Bishop Diomedes. In both, the Bishop was portrayed as a martyr, deposed because of his criticism of the Church’s “unholy alliance with the Kremlin”.

Russian media, by contrast, followed the Council more closely. According to Google News, a total of 422 Council-related stories appeared in Russian-language media outlets. More liberal publications such as Kommersant, Komsomol’skaya Pravda, and Gazeta.RU focused primarily on the few hundred so-called Diomedites — supporters of the Chukotkan bishop — who organized a protest outside of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. Some reports were downright satirical — IA Regnum ran the headline “First Sharia Courts, Now Church Courts come to Russia”, referring to the Spiritual Courts document adopted by the Council.

Political outlets focused primarily on any political message that could be gleaned from the Council, such as possible implications for Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Estonia relations.

Honest, respectful, and, for the most part, accurate, reporting came from the Russian news agency Novosti and the state-run television network RTR.  Novosti was also responsible for organizing the daily press conferences.

The blogosphere was mostly filled with supporters of Bishop Diomedes and their “open letters”, “appeals”, and angry posts. Again, the Council went mostly unreported in the West. A few blogs, like “Voices from Russia” reprinted stories from Interfax. The only complete Council coverage, according to Google Blogsearch, was by yours truly.

Tomorrow, the hierarchs will serve the Divine Liturgy at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, marking the feast of All Russian Saints.

The Council: Day Four

In its fourth and final day, the 2008 Bishops’ Council made a number of decisions, issued an epistle to the flock, and issued epistles to the Presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Moldova. In our continuing coverage of the Council’s work, we present the highlights of these documents below.

Canonical-Theological Evaluation and Decision Regarding Bishop Diomedes

The Council published a Canonical-Theological Evaluation of statements by Bishop Diomedes of Anadyr and Chukotka, prepared by the Synodal Theological Committee under the presidency of Metroplitan Philaret of Minsk. The Evaluation presents responses to the Bishop’s statements, based mostly on the “Social Concept”. You may find the full Russian text here. I will only summarize some of its main arguments.

Regarding the Bishop’s claims that monarchy is the only true from of government and that the current government is “anti-popular”, the bishops wrote:

Orthodoxy is above all forms of government, and monarchy is only one of them, having only relative significance historically. … There is no reason to view as anti-popular that authority, which enjoys the support of a majority of people. … The term “neo-Sergianism” is a new concoction and is out of line. … The term has lost its meaning since all issues concerning so-called Sergianism were resolved during the dialogue between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Church Abroad.

Concerning the bishop’s allegations that the Church is too involved in the ecumenical movement and that the Patriarch prayed with heretics at the Notre Dame cathedral in Paris, the statement quotes from the document signed by the Patriarchate and the ROCOR:

The Orthodox Church categorically rejects any liturgical communion with the heterodox. In particular, Orthodox involvement in liturgical acts of so-called ecumenical or multi-faith services is completely unacceptable.

But this does not reject Orthodox prayers at common Christian holy sites, controlled by the heterodox, the document claims.

Orthodox visits to Catholic or Protestant houses of worship, presence at heterodox services without public or hidden prayer, Orthodox prayer at pan-Christian holy sites are completely acceptable. Only public or private prayers with the heterodox are unacceptable for Orthodox Christians.

The document also accuses the Chukotka bishop of violating Canons and the Statute by issuing epistles to the entire Russian Church. Only the Patriarch and the Holy Synod can issue such epistles, the document states. Diocesan bishops can only circulate epistles within their own dioceses.

Upon hearing the recommendations in this document, the Council voted that Bishop Diomedes of Chukotka ought to be deposed, unless he offers complete repentance before the Holy Synod at its next meeting. Interstingly, the bishops voted to depose Bishop Diomedes despite the fact that His Grace was absent from the meeting, citing ill health. The bishops found his claim of ill health unsubstantiated.

Concerning Changes to the Statute

The bishops adopted changes to the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, which reflect the reconciliation with the ROCOR and the enacting of the Statutes of Ecclesiastic Courts. In particular, the Statute reaffirms the ROCOR’s status as a self-governing entity.

Other Decisions

The bishops adopted decisions on a whole set of topics, which you can view here. Here are just some of the decisions the Council made:

• Approves the creation of new dioceses in Russia and the Ukraine and the reunion with ROCOR (p. 3)
• Calls for pastoral seminars and heightened theological education of the clergy (p. 4)
• Calls for the establishment of diocesan funds for assistance for the financial benefit of monasteries, poorer parishes, and social work (p. 6)
• Calls for more active missionary work and catechisis (p. 14)
• Calls for the reinstitution of military chaplains in the Russian armed forces (p. 16)
• Calls for the creation of youth centers and other institutions to work with the youth (p. 18 )
• Reminds that an episcopal blessing is necessary for the distribution of any printed material within the bishop’s diocese (p. 20)
• Calls for greater presence in the media, including more Orthodox TV channels and websites for every diocese (p. 23)
• Calls for a canonical resolution to the Ukrainian schisms, affirms support for Metropolitan Vladimir, and calls on schismatics to return to the Mother Church (pp. 25-27)
• Expresses regret at the present state of inter-Orthodox relations (p. 29) and calls on the Ecumenical Patriarchate to resolve the situation in Estonia (p. 31). Given the Constantinople’s decision to unilaterally include their Estonian jurisdiction in pan-Orthodox gatherings, calls for the inclusion in the same of autonomous parts of the Russian Church: the Ukrainian, Japanese, Chinese, Moldovan, Latvian, and Estonian churches, the Church Abroad, and the OCA. (p. 31)
• Calls for resolution of the Moldovan crisis by the Romanian Patriarchate (p. 32)
• Concerning ecumenical dialog, resolves: “In the process of dialog, our Church does not accept any attempts to “dilute the faith”, rejecting all joint prayer services, which artificially mingle confessional and religious traditions. At the same time, it has always been acceptable for Orthodox Christians to worship at pan-Christian holy sites located in heterodox houses of worship. Neither does the practice of the Orthodox Church disallow the presence of heterodox or atheists persons in Orthodox temples during services; it was indeed the visiting the Church of the Holy Wisdom by emissaries of Prince Vladimir that opened the way for Russia’s acceptance of Orthodoxy.” (p. 36)
• Concerning relations with the Roman Catholics, states that unitism and proselytism remain obstacles to better relations (p. 37)
• Calls on the Ukrainian government not to meddle in church affairs (p. 44)
• Calls on the Estonian government to grant the Estonian Orthodox Church (MP) full legal rights (p. 45)
• Calls on the Chinese government to give greater rights to Orthodox Christians (p. 46)
• Calls for the teaching of “Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture” in public schools (p. 48 )
• Calls on the Russian government to speed up the process of returning church property still controlled by the state (p. 50)

Statement on Church Unity

Since Church Unity was the theme for this Council, the bishops adopted a statement on the subject. The document praises the reconcilliation of the two parts of the Russian Church, the ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate. The bishops call on those in schism to return to the Church:

Turning to all who, for whatever reason, have not accepted the new-found unity, the Council calls them to communion in the love of Christ, which “seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”

With the same words, the Council turns towards the children of the Russian Church, living within her historical boundaries, but have separated from her for various political or nationalistic reasons or as a result of the meddling of the powers of this world in the life of the Church.

The bishops decided that the feast of St Vladimir the Enlightener (28 (15) July) will be celebrated from now on as a great feast. The bishops called on the governments of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to make it a national holiday, marking the “unity of Holy Russia [which is] the greatest treasure of our Church and of our peoples”.

After calling, once again, for the resolution of schisms in Ukraine, Moldova, and Estonia, the bishops had this to say about the Ecumenical Patriarchate:

Such vision by the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate of its own rights and prerogatives is categorically opposed to the canonical tradition of the Church, which serves as the foundation of the existence of the Russian Church and other Local Churches. It is also opposed to present goals in the Churches’ spiritual care for the diaspora.

Recognizing that such issues can only be considered at an Ecumenical Council, the Council calls on the Constantinopolitan Church to refrain from any actions that could blow up Orthodox unity until a pan-Orthodox consideration of such novelties can be considered. This is especially true of any attempts to reconsider the canonical boundaries of existing churches.

Epistles to the Presidents

In its letters to the Presidents of Russia and Belarus, the Council called for the establishment of St Vladimir’s day as a national holiday, celebrating unity. The Council also issued a letter to Vladimir Voronin, President of Moldova, praising the role of the Moldovan Church in Moldovan society.

Epistle to the Flock

The Council issued an Epistle to the Clergy, Monastics, and Faithful Children of the Russian Orthodox Church, in which it broadly summarized the Council’s work. In marking the 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia, the Epistle states:

Though from the moment of Russia’s accpetance of Christianity over one thousand years have passed, the goals of the Russian Church have not changed. As in ages past, she is called to sanctify and transfigure this world, bringing it to unity with its Lord and Saviour, and brigning to human society the fruits of the life-giving activity of the Holy Spirit: “love, joy, peace, longsuffering, goodness, compassion, faith, meakness, temperance.”

In marking the 90th anniversary of the murder of the Royal Family, the Council called on society and the state to “give a true moral evaluation of the crime committed in 1918″. The bishops concluded with the words of St Paul:

We turn to you, dear fathers, brothers, and sisters, with words of hope and joy: “the God of peace, that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work to do His will, working in you that which is wellpleasing in His sight, through Jesus Christ; to Whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.”

Tomorrow the hierarchs will serve a Service of Thanksgiving in the Dormition Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin. It will be followed by a reception at the State Kremlin Palace; President Medvedev is expected to be in attendance.

The Council: Day Three

At its third day of work, the Council adopted two important documents, the Statutes of Ecclesiastic Courts in the Russian Orthodox Church and the much-discussed Fundamentals of the Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church about Human Dignity, Liberties, and Rights. In our continuing coverage of the Council, we present some excerpts from the human rights document and report on the work of the working groups.

The Human Rights Document

In the preamble to the document, the bishops explain why a conciliar statement on human rights is necessary.

In the contemporary world, the idea that the institute of human rights can in and of itself lead to the best development of human identity and to the best social organization has received broad support. At the same time, citing defense of human rights as their basis, views contrary to Christian doctrine are frequently expressed. Christians find themselves in such a condition, where social and state organizations may attempt to force them, or already force them, to act in ways contrary to the commandments of God.

The document then presents the idea of human dignity, as being tightly tied to the teaching that man is created in God’s image and likeness.  However, the idea of dignity cannot be separated from acting in God’s image and likeness. To quote a part of the statement:

In Orthodox tradition, man’s keeping his God-given dignity and growth in it is conditional on his life in accordance with moral norms, because these norms express the primordial–and, therefore, the true–human nature, not darkened by sin.  Therefore there exists a direct link between human dignity and morality.  Moreover, accepting the idea of the dignity of the person necessarily means accepting its [the person's -A.A] moral responsibility.

The document then contrasts the notion of freedom with the Church’s teaching about freedom from sin. In part, it states:

While it accepts the value of free choice, the Church nonetheless posits that it [free choice -A.A.] ceases to exist when the individual chooses evil. Evil and liberty are incompatible.

The weakness of the institution of human rights lies in this, that is to say, that while defending free choice, (αὐτεξουσίον) it focuses less and less on … freedom from sin (ἐλευθερία). Society ought to consider both freedoms, seeking a harmony between them in the public sphere. It is improper to defend one while forgetting about the other. It is impossible to defend what is good and what is free without free choice. Yet freedom of choice, too, looses its value and meaning if it turns toward evil.

In discussing human rights, the hierarchs wrote:

From the standpoint of the Orthodox Church, the institution of human rights can serve the noble goals of defending human dignity and urge the moral and spiritual development of the person. To this end, implemented human rights ought not contradict the God-established moral norms. Individual rights cannot be set up in contradiction with the values and interests of the Fatherland, the community, the family.

The hierarchs addressed some issues within the category of human rights. About the right to life, they wrote:

Life is God’s gift to man. … The Church condemns suicide because he who commits suicide … renounces life as a gift from God. In light of this, the legalization of so-called euthanasia is completely unacceptable. It constitutes the union of murder and suicide.

On freedom of choice, the Church writes:

Often, freedom of choice is interpreted as a demand for religious pluralism and the neutrality or indifference of state and society toward religion. Some interpretations of religious freedom posit all religions to be relative or “equally true.” This is unacceptable for the Church, which, while honoring freedom of choice, is called to bear witness about the Truth which it preserves and to condemn errors from it.

The document then addresses the Church’s social ministry, stating that:

From ancient times to this day, the Orthodox Church pleads before authorities about those who have been wrongly convicted, denied their rights, or exploited. … In the same way we are today called to zealously defend human rights and dignities, both in words and in actions. … Having as its basis the Church’s teaching about human dignity, liberty, and rights, Christians are called to perform morally oriented social ministry.

The document is expected to stir serious discussion in international and ecumenical fora.

Reports of the groups

The Council’s five working groups delivered their reports. In particular, the “Church, State, and Society” working group issued the following statement:

[T]oday we see the opening of a new chapter in the history of Church-state and Church-society relations. Those principles of relations, which were developed during the Byzantine Empire, the Synodal Period, and, especially, during the Soviet Era, are no longer valid. … While recognizing the equality of all before the law, regardless of their faith, the state can give certain prerogatives to some religious groups in light of their numbers, date of founding, and contribution to society. [T]he teaching of “Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture” and similar courses in our public schools has revealed their positive contribution to the eduction of our youth.

The group “Youth Affairs, Mass Media, and Publishing” noted the importance of the media and the Internet in the Church’s ministry but also noted the lack of accountability and the presence of publications, websites, and organizations claiming to be “Orthodox” but in fact do not represent the Church’s views.

The group “Orthodox Witness and Contemporary Society” heard a report on the publications and writings of Bishop Diomedes of Chukotka. It is expected that the Council will make a formal decision about his activities tomorrow.