In my prior coverage of Georgia’s invasion of South Ossetia, I posited that what Russia needed most was a quick and decisive victory, which would limit damage to merely the public affairs front. As the fog of war begins to settle in the Caucasus (and the residents of Tskhinvali begin to pick up what’s left of their houses) we can see more clearly who are the winners and losers of Mr. Saakashvili’s gamble.
The Winners
Russian self-esteem. The Russian military was able to deliver a swift and crushing blow to Georgian armed forces, armed and trained by the Bush Administration. After the debacle in the first war in Chechnya and Russia’s failure to prevent the dismemberment of Serbia, this is a definite boost for Russian morale. It shows that Russia is willing, and able, to defend its interests abroad.
Mr. Medvedev. Dmitry Medvedev was able to present himself as a confident and assertive war-time leader. Prior to his election, Mr. Medvedev was virtually unknown; this proved to be the first major test of his presidency. This will also put an end to some of the speculation about who “is in power” in the Kremlin. Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin showed that they can work effectively as a team, the one on the foreign policy and military fronts, the other — on internal affairs, disaster recovery, and social programs.
Old Europe. The Europeans in general were able to play the situation much more effectively than the Bush administration. In particular, the events in South Ossetia give further credence to Europe’s (most notably, Germany and France) opposition to letting Georgia join NATO. Old Europe has taken a more pragmatic stance toward Russia. Note that it was Mr. Sarkozy who travelled to Moscow and Tbilisi with a cease-fire proposal, not Ms. Rice. On the whole, Europe has made it clear that it does not want a fight with Russia.
John McCain. Mr. McCain was better able to capitalize on the situation than rival presidential candidate Barack Obama. As the Georgians carpet bombed Tskhinvali, Mr. Obama was vacationing in Hawaii. John McCain quickly made serveral statements condeming Russia and issuing support for Georgia. (To use his famous words, “we are all Georgians”.) Besides gleaning votes from anti-Russian rhetoric, John McCain used the situation to assert his image as a confident leader able to deal with international crises. To a large extent, Mr. McCain’s confidence on the issue had to do with his personal friendship with Mikhail Saakashvili and with the fact that his foreign policy advisor, Randy Scheunemann, was a lobbyist for the Georgian government. Though the media picked up on this somewhat, it is not clear that this conflict of interest will hurt Mr. McCain.
The Loosers
Georgian territorial integrity. The situation in the North Caucasus is deja vu: a simmering ethnic conflict; one side uses excessive military force; an ally gets involved, claiming genocide and ethnic cleansing; then, the ally declares the region independent and presents the world as a fait accompli. If it walks like Kosovo, and it talks like Kosovo, then it’s surely … well, you get the point. And while the word “Kosovo” was not on the lips of Russian diplomats, one could bet it was on their minds.
Mr. Saakashvili. The Georgian president can only come out weaker, both at home and abroad. At home — because he picked the right fight but lost it. Abroad — because he made it clear that he cannot be trusted. While the position of Washington is not yet clear, members of the Georgian opposition were treated much more warmly in Brussels (albeit still only in the couloirs).
Media integrity. The MSM revealed its ugly face again, one that we have not seen arguably since the conflict in Bosnia. From FoxNews cutting off a twelve year-old Ossetian girl who showed too much support for the Russians to CNN presenting footage of Tskhinvali and claiming it was Gori in Georgia, the coverage had a clear message. Mr. Saakashvili was right and Russia was wrong. Never mind that Georgian armed forces carpet bombed Tskhinvali, drove out the population, killed Russian peace-keepers, and violated the treaties they had signed in the 90s. Even such rivals as Liberation, Le Figaro, and Le Monde became friends for a week. By mid-week it became obvious that if Russia had won the war on the ground, it had lost the war of public opinion in the West.
Of course, the anti-Russian bias was to be expected. More evidence for the thesis of Danilevsky and other Slavophiles.
In the end, the biggest looser was the civilian population of South Ossetia. This war was completely unnecessary; yet 2,000 – 3,000 civilians were killed and countless others displaced. I wonder if, as they were trained by American military consultants, Georgian forces learned, among other things, the term “collateral damage”. One of the great inventions of US English.
More South Ossetia coverage: Dr. Trifkovic for analysis and Wayne Allensworth for some more background reading.
Ukraine – looser, winner?
[Editor's note: Mmm ... Too early to call? Depends on what happens with the Black Sea fleet. For now, Ukraine decided against confrontation over the Crimean. But Yuschenko is definitely out. See my earlier posts on Ukrainian politics. My prediction is that Timoshenko will be elected the next president. She has a more pragmatic "Russia policy".]