While the Russian media have, generally, covered the election of Metropolitan Cyrill as Patriarch of all Russia positively, opinion in the Western press has been centered on two fronts. Some are debating if the new Patriarch is “for” or “against” the Kremlin. Others — if he is a “modernizer” or a “conservative”.
The Economist, for example, labeled Metropolitan Cyrill “a tough and sophisticated practitioner of geopolitics” (whatever that means), labeled one of his “opponents”, Metropolitan Kliment, as a “cautious conservative” and another, Metroplitan Juvenaly, as a “loyal son of the state, while acting in private to protect the church’s liberals”. The fact that The Economist offers labels and no facts shows that they don’t really what they’re talking about.
The wires offer similar material. The AP calls Patriarch Cyrill a “modernizer who could seek a historic reconciliation with the Vatican and more autonomy from the state” and the LA Times expects the new Patriarch to “undertake some modest modernization”. Finally, Reuters seems to believe that the most important issue is when (and not even whether!) he will meet with Pope Benedict XVI.
To label Patriarch Cyrill a “modernizer” and a “reformer” is to show utter ignorance of Orthodoxy. What exactly is he proposing to reform? Theology? Practice? Liturgy? This is the man who, as Metropolitan, said: “I am categorically opposed to any reforms … If a reform destroys faith, tradition, values, then such a reform is called heresy”.
The problem is that anyone outside the Church is inclined to label all events within the Church a struggle between “liberals” and “conservatives”, even when such a dichotomy fails to exist. Those news sources with a blatant dislike of the Kremlin (like The Economist) tend to show the same dislike for the Russian Orthodox Church. Others need to find some issue that divides said “liberals” and “conservatives”, and they’ve found it in a proposed meeting with the Pope.
The reality for those who consider Patriarch Cyrill their “great lord and father”, though, is quite different. Whom the Patriarch decides to meet is his prerogative and of little tangible importance. Far more important are some of the important issues he will have to face. Here are just some of them:
Parish Life — Implementing the Parish Bylaws of the 1917-1918 Local Council and the normalization of parish life, destroyed during the years of state persecution. This will mean first and foremost the resolution of property issues — the State must finally return to parishes all property confiscated from the Church following the Bolshevik Revolution. This will mean keeping a register of parishioners, creating parish assemblies and parish councils to administer internal parish affairs as well as the further development of parish schools, libraries, and the like.
Missionary Outreach — Reaching out to those in Russia who consider themselves “Orthodox” but are not churched. This begins with implementing the Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture (OPK) curriculum in public schools, which has so far been stymied by the Ministry of Education.
Social Outreach — Broadening the social ministry of the Church. The most pressing issue here is the implementation of the Army and Navy chaplaincy programs.
The Jurisdictional Issue — The five-year transitional period following the ROCOR-MP reconciliation will be over during Patriarch Cyrill’s tenure. He will have to lead the Synod into making important decisions about jurisdiction in the diaspora, resolving the problem of parallel structures in a way that unites, not divides.
Fundraising — If parishes in the cities are fairly well off, parishes and monasteries in the villages are still for the most part in ruins. Priest’s salaries are virtually non-existent. The new patriarch will need to find a way to channel donor funds to places that need them most. One suggestion has already been made — the creation of a bank that will issue credit to village parishes.
Lay involvement — Unfortunately, the term concerned Orthodox lay people has become synonymous with supporters of the deposed Bishop Diomides. The new patriarch will need find creative ways to get laity involved in more tangible issues. Some members of the Local Council have already aired one idea — the creation of a consultative body composed of laity, similar to Russia’s Public Chamber.
The Estonian Issue — Solving the conflict with the Ecumenical Patriarchate over jurisdiction in Estonia will be a top priority in Inter-Orthodox relations. Until Moscow and Constantinople reach agreement on this issue, all further work toward the calling of a Great Council of all the local Orthodox churches will be meaningless.
Relations with the Old-Ritualists — Patriarch Alexey II was instrumental in establishing cordial relations with two jurisdictions of priestly Old-Ritualists. In addition, the late Patriarch supported increased interest in pre-Nikonian liturgics. The creation of the Patriarchal Center for Ancient Liturgical Practice in Moscow as well as the increased usage of Znamenny chant in many parishes and monasteries provide some hope that reconciliation with the Old-Ritualists is possible.
Luckily, Patriarch Cyrill is well prepared to address these issues. Brilliantly educated, incredibly smart, an excellent orator, he is greatly respected both by his fellow bishops and by those outside of the Church. If Patriarch Alexey’s tenure was the “Second Baptism of Russia”, then Patriarch Cyrill’s may well be Russia’s Second Chrismation.